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Abstract 
 We empirically test the effects of unanticipated fiscal policy shocks on the growth 
rate and the cyclical component of real private output and reveal different types of 
asymmetries in fiscal policy implementation. The data used are quarterly U.S. observations 
over the period 1967:1 to 2011:4. In doing so, we use two alternative vector autoregressive 
systems in order to construct the fiscal policy shocks: one with the simple sum monetary 
aggregate MZM and one with the alternative CFS Divisia MZM aggregate. From each one of 
these systems we extracted four types of shocks: a negative and a positive government 
spending shock and a negative and a positive government revenue shock. These eight 
different types of unanticipated fiscal shocks were used next to empirically examine their 
effects on the growth rate and cyclical component of real private GNP  in two sets of 
regressions: one that assumes only contemporaneous effects of the shocks on output and one 
that is augmented with four lags of each fiscal shock. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper we empirically test the existence of non-linearities that may be associated 
with the conduct of fiscal policy.  In doing so, we try to detect two types of fiscal policy 
asymmetries: first, whether equal in magnitude contractionary or expansionary fiscal shocks 
have the same multiplier impact on real output, and second whether theoretically equal –in 
terms of their impact on the government budget fiscal policy tools, such as a tax cut or an 
increase in government spending, have the same impact on output. 
Fiscal and monetary policies are the cornerstone of policymaking.  However, until 2000 the 
main bulk of empirical research was dedicated solely to the effects of monetary policy. In the 
aftermath of the global crisis of 2008 there is a growing debate of whether governments 
should run fiscal stimulus packages in order to restore previous growth rates or run an 
austerity program to reduce deficits and in the long-run debt as a percent of GDP. Recently 
for example, highly indebted Eurozone countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) are 
required to implement fiscal austerity measures in order to balance their balance sheets. In 
this context it is interesting to see whether and how Keynesian principles may apply.  
According to (Bertola and Drazen, 1993), governments should choose fiscal stimulus 
packages if they accept a positive and above unity fiscal multiplier regardless of the debt to 
GDP ratio.  Keynesian economics assert that government spending and tax cuts, directly 
affect disposable private income and through the channel of active demand the economy 
tracks itself back to a growth path. The fiscal multiplier under Keynesian beliefs is well above 
unity as there is no crowding out effect and the wealth effect is not so strong. Due to various 
rigidities in the markets (labor, goods and services), this fiscal stimulus during recessions and 
fiscal contraction during boom times accordingly, is necessary and appropriate in order to 
restore equilibrium. Although, the exact value of the multiplier depends on various other 
factors, such as the simultaneous usage of monetary policy, the openness of the economy, the 
exchange rate regime e.t.c.  its sign, however, is not under question: we expect a positive 
impact on GDP from an increase in government spending. 
The neoclassical school on the other hand, asserts that government spending or tax cuts have 
no impact on GDP due to the Ricardian equivalence (Barro 1974). Agents fully anticipate the 
debt burden of the fiscal stimulus, expecting higher taxes in the future (wealth effect). Thus, 
in order to smooth out their level of consumption they save more now reducing current 
private consumption. There is a crowding out effect of the private sector that fully offsets the 
increase of the demand from the public sector which renders the fiscal multiplier to zero. This 
is more apparent in periods of growth, since then the probability of a more efficient usage of 
resources from the government is lower than it is during a recession. On the other hand, there 
is room for a low positive multiplier during recessions, since resources are underused. 
There is also a new class of research pointing to an exactly different direction than that of 
Keynesian economics: these find that the multiplier of fiscal contraction is positive and vice 
versa. This is known as contractionary fiscal expansion effect or expansionary fiscal 
contraction due mostly to a wealth effect that is, consumers put more weight to future 
consumption than to current one.  At this notion, Alesina and Perotti (1997) and Giavazzi and 
Pagano (1990) among others, state that fiscal contraction based on expenditure cuts maybe 
expansionary if it is accompanied by a currency devaluation or by agreements with the 
unions. The greater this adjustment is the more is being anticipated by the agents leading to 
more powerful results.  Furthermore, a tax increase in order to accommodate a deficit has the 
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exact opposite results than a decrease of government spending because it reduces the 
competitiveness of the economy. This view is enhanced by Blanchard (1990), who states that 
fiscal consolidation may reduce uncertainty for the future leading to an increase in 
household’s wealth today. This can be achieved through the decrease of interest rates as a 
result of the reduction of the risk premium of government bonds (Alesina and Ardagna 2009). 
In their seminal paper, Bertola and Drazen (1993), postulate that the sign of the fiscal 
multiplier depends on the GDP to debt ratio. In a hypothetical economy, where all agents are 
rational, and GDP to debt ratio is low, an increase of the government spending will be neutral 
to the real economy, featuring a Ricardian or even a negative effect. If the GDP to debt ratio 
is relatively large a fiscal consolidation signals a trial of the government to stabilize the 
economy and thus lifting future uncertainty leading to a positive multiplier or to an anti – 
Keynesian effect. 
According to the above, the fiscal multiplier for an increase in government expenditures can 
range between negative and positive values and be large or small. According to the above, we 
can identify five potential sources of non – linearities/asymmetries of fiscal policy: a) the 
phase of the business cycle, b) the GDP to debt ratio, c) the sign of the shock (positive versus 
negative shocks of the same instrument), d) the nature of the shock (spending versus 
revenues), e) the magnitude of the shock. 
In this paper, we try to estimate the value of the fiscal multiplier taking into account the sign 
and the nature of the shock. Using VAR analysis with identified structural errors, a new 
dataset for the U.S. economy and running various tests, we come along some very interesting 
results. We cannot reject asymmetries in government spending between a positive 
unanticipated government spending shock and a negative such shock. The same asymmetries 
are detected for the unanticipated government revenue shocks. We also detect asymmetries in 
expansionary and contractionary unexpected fiscal policies.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the empirical literature 
review, Section 3 provides a detailed description of the data and the methodology used. The 
main results are presented in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
Despite this divergence of opinions, the empirical research is too narrow and is divided 
between linear and nonlinear policy analysis. Linear analysis covers most of the research, 
while nonlinear analysis is being implemented only in recent years. Empirical research 
focused into fiscal policy in the last decade following mostly the seminal work of Blanchard 
and Perotti (2002) in a VAR analysis which was built upon the innovative work of Sims 
(1980) in VAR analysis. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) introduced a new method of 
identification of structural errors using institutional information on tax and transfer system 
and under the main assumption, among others, that fiscal policy is a rather long process using 
quarterly data introduce their restrictions and identify structural fiscal shocks that are 
exogenous to the rest of the VAR variables. They conclude that, the U.S. economy 
experiences Keynesian effects regarding the sign of fiscal multipliers as well as there are 
asymmetries between tax and government purchases multipliers but not asymmetries of the 
effects on the output of a positive versus a negative change in taxes. Tagkalakis (2008) using 
an unbalanced yearly panel data set (1970-2002) of nineteen OECD countries, confirmed that 
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in the presence of binding liquidity constraints during recessions both positive government 
spending and negative tax shocks have stronger stimuli effects on private consumption than in 
expansions. In a different analytical framework Leeper et al. (2010) show that government 
investment is contractionary in the short run, at worst, and has a muted impact, at best. This is 
mainly due to substantial time to build lags. The results over the long run are conditional upon 
the productivity of the public capital. Pereira and Lopes (2010) examining U.S. quarterly data 
over the 1965:2 to 2009:2 period in a Blanchard-Perron identification mode into a Bayesian 
simulation procedure, they find that policy effectiveness has come down substantially. More 
specifically, this trend is more evident for taxes net of transfers than for government 
expenditures, although, fiscal multipliers keep Keynesian signs. Cogan et al. (2009), focusing 
on an empirically estimated macroeconomic model for the U.S., find that the government 
spending multipliers are much less in new Keynesian that in old Keynesian models. The 
multipliers are less than one as consumption and investment are crowded out. On the other 
hand, Romer and Romer (2010), using new sources of data such as presidential speeches, 
executive-branch documents and Congressional reports, identify the size, timing and principal 
motivation for all major post-war tax policy actions. Their main findings indicate a very large 
effect of tax changes on output and on investments. This multiplier is well above unity, being 
in stark contrast with the findings of previous empirical researches. Barro and Redlick (2009), 
estimate a multiplier regarding responses of U.S. GDP to changes in defence spending 
between 0.6-0.7.  As they point out in their paper, the exact volume of the multiplier is subject 
to economic slack, reaching unity as unemployment rate is quite high, around 12%. Positive 
tax rate shocks have significantly negative effects on real GDP growth. Mountford and Uhlig 
(2009), incorporating a VAR analysis and using new restrictions to identify revenue and 
spending shocks, as well as taking into account business cycle and monetary shocks, conclude 
that deficit financed tax cuts are the best fiscal policy to improve GDP, finding a very large 
multiplier. Gali et al. (2007), show that in an economy in which for some households (named 
rule of thumb consumers) consumption equals labor income and there exist sticky prices, it is 
possible that government spending shocks positively affect consumption. In this way, wealth 
effects are totally overshadowed by the sensitivity to current disposable income. Aggregate 
demand is partly insulated from the negative wealth effect generated by the higher levels of 
taxes needed to finance the fiscal expansion. 
In a non-linear framework, Baum and Koester (2011), using a threshold VAR model, analyse 
the effects of fiscal policy on economic activity over the business cycle for Germany. They 
derive a fiscal multiplier around 0.7 for both revenues and spending in a linear model. When 
they take into account the phase of the business cycle, they find a spending multiplier around 
unity in boom times and 0.36 in recessions. There are also non linearities regarding the sign 
of government intervention through spending. With respect to revenue shocks they find less 
diverging results for both the phase of the business cycle and the type of fiscal policy 
implemented (expansionary or contractionary). 
As it is clear from the above, empirical research spans a wide range of tests, including linear 
and non–linear models concerning the phase of the business cycle, the financial constraint of 
the agents, the nature and the sign of the fiscal intervention. Most of these studies, converge 
to fiscal multiplies below unity with the spending multiplier being of greater importance than 
the tax multiplier. In what follows we try to unfold the impact of fiscal policy using quarterly 
data for the U.S. economy for government spending, total government revenue, GNP (growth 
rate and cyclical component) and monetary variables such as the Treasury bill rate and the 
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money supply.  In this study we introduce three main innovations: first, to the best of our 
knowledge the Divisia monetary aggregates have not yet been used to previous research 
pertaining to fiscal policy. Second, following Cover’s (1992) procedure of identifying 
monetary policy shocks we extract the unanticipated fiscal policy shocks on government 
spending and revenue. Finally, we explicitly test for the asymmetric effects on the growth rate 
and the cyclical component of real private GNP of a contractionary and expansionary fiscal 
policy. We come up with three key findings; first, all fiscal multipliers are below unity but 
with signs as predicted by Keynesian theory. Second, government expenditures have a larger 
impact as compared to the tax policy and finally, positive government spending shocks are 
more significant than negative spending shocks. All these results are in line with previous 
studies and are robust through many tests using structural identification proposed by 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002). 
3. The Data 
In this study we use quarterly data that span the period 1967Q1 to 2011Q4. The range 
of the data sample is limited by the availability of the monetary aggregates. The data are taken 
from the St. Louis Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) service. These include the real 
private Gross National Product, government consumption expenditures and gross investment, 
government current receipts and the 3-month Treasury bill rate
2
. All initial data are in current 
values and they are transformed –with the exception of the Treasury-bill rate- to real series by 
using the implicit price deflator of the GNP with 2005 as the base year. The two monetary 
aggregates used in this study are the official simple-sum aggregates in the MZM level of 
aggregation as they are reported by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and the Divisia 
MZM aggregates both in real terms. The Divisia monetary aggregate series are from the new 
Divisia monetary aggregates maintained within the Center of Financial Stability (CFS) 
program Advances in Monetary and Financial Measurement (AMFM), called CFS Divisia 
aggregates and documented in Barnett et al. (2013). We use both types of monetary 
aggregates in an effort to see whether our results are affected by the so-called “Barnett 
critique”. In this regard, Barnett (1980) argues that official simple-sum monetary aggregates, 
constructed by the Federal Reserve, produce an internal inconsistency between the implicit 
aggregation theory and the theory relevant to the models and policy within which the 
resulting data are nested and used. That incoherence has been called the Barnett Critique [see, 
for example, Chrystal and MacDonald (1994) and Belongia and Ireland (2013)], with 
emphasis on the resulting inference and policy errors and the induced appearances of function 
instability. Finally, all data with the exception of the Treasury-bill rate are transformed to 
natural logarithms. To test the integration properties if our data we perform three different 
unit root tests: a) an augmented Dickey-Fuller test, b) a KPSS test where the null hypothesis 
is stationarity and finally c) an Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock test. In Table 1 we present the results 
of these unit root tests and we conclude that all variables used in this study are I(1). Thus for 
the rest of the empirical section we use the first differences of the variables unless otherwise 
stated. 
                                                             
2 The relevant FRED codes are GNPC96, GCEC, GRECPT and TB3MS respectively. 
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4. Empirical Model and Identification 
Since we determined in the previous section that all our variables are I(1) we proceed 
by testing our variables for a commons stochastic trend. Table 3, reports the results of the 
Johansen maximum likelihood cointegration tests on a VAR with lag length p = 3. We also 
report tail areas of residual misspecification tests. Two test statistics are used to test for the 
number of cointegrating vectors, the trace (      ) and maximum eigenvalue (    ) test 
statistics. In the trace test the null hypothesis that there are at most r cointegrating vectors is 
tested against a general alternative. In the case of the maximum eigenvalue test the alternative 
is explicitly stated. Using 99% critical values for the two tests we that the        and      
test statistics provide evidence of one cointegrating relation in both VAR models we test: one 
with the simple sum MZM as the exogenous monetary aggregate and the other with the CFS 
Divisia instead. Since we detected one cointegrating vector, we proceed in our analysis by 
using a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) including the lagged error correction term in 
the VARs regressors. 
 As it was previously mentioned, we use a structural VAR model with two alternative 
sets of exogenous variables. We perform a Blanchard-Perotti (2002) identification procedure 
to extract the structural errors. The basic reduced form VAR specification in order to identify 
the structural errors is: 
                                                                 ,                                             (1) 
where    is a three dimensional vector of the endogenous variables, government revenue (r), 
government spending (g) and real private Gross National Product (y) and Zt is a vector of the 
two exogenous monetary variables, the 3-month Treasury bill rate (TB3) and the monetary 
aggregate, where we use alternatively a simple-sum and a CFS Divisia in the MZM level of 
aggregation. All variables are in first differences. The exogenous variables vector is two 
dimensional because we use each monetary aggregate separately along with the TB3 variable. 
   represents the three dimensional vector of reduced form residuals with the corresponding 
ordering [rt,gt,yt] and finally A0 is the intercept coefficient vector, A(Lq) is a four lag 
polynomial and B is the exogenous variables coefficients vector. A four quarter lag length is 
chosen as there is a seasonality pattern in the response of taxes to output – see Blanchard-
Perotti (2002).  
4.1 Blanchard-Perotti Identification 
 We employ the Blanchard-Perotti (2002) method of structural identification. As they 
well document in their seminal paper, the innovations in the fiscal variables, taxes and 
revenues are a linear combination of three types of shocks, a) the automatic response of these 
fiscal variables to output (automatic stabilizers), b) the discretionary effects of revenues to 
spending shocks and vice versa, c) the random fiscal shocks which are to be identified. Thus, 
the equation system is: 
       
        
    
  
       
        
    
  
         
      
    
    
In order to set the appropriate restrictions Blanchard and Perotti further assume that 
the first set of shocks (a1 and b1  for taxes and spending respectively) can be estimated as the 
elasticity of fiscal variables to output shocks as it takes more than a quarter for a fiscal policy 
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measure to be decided and be implemented. As a measure for tax elasticity on output, a1, we 
take into consideration Blanchard-Perotti’s calculations who report an average value of 2.  As 
for the spending multiplier, b1, this is set to zero, as the main component of primary 
government spending, unemployment transfers is included in net revenues
3
.  Then, 
contemporaneous effect of fiscal variables to output (c1 and c2) need to be estimated. Again in 
line with Blanchard et al (2002) and Baum et al. (2011), we use the cyclically adjusted 
reduced form fiscal policy shocks and we estimate the third equation of the equation system 
2. Finally, under the assumption that revenue decisions come first, a2 is set to zero. This is so, 
because a2 represents the discretionary response of revenues to spending. 
We extract both fiscal policy structural errors: from government revenue and the 
government spending vector. Two sets of such errors are used: the ones from the simple sum 
MZM monetary aggregate as an exogenous variable VAR and the ones from the VAR with 
the Divisia MZM as an exogenous variable. 
5. The Empirical results 
 Following Cover (1992), from each of the above two systems we extract the residual 
series from the equations of government revenue (r) and government spending (g). These 
represent the unanticipated fiscal policy shocks. The series of the negative government 
spending shocks equals the government spending shock if the latter is negative otherwise it is 
equal to zero. The series of the positive government spending shocks equals the government 
spending shock if this is positive and otherwise it is equal to zero. In the same manner we 
construct the negative and positive government revenue shocks. Formally: 
        ⁄ [|    |      ] 
       ⁄ [|    |      ]  
where      is the government spending shock extracted as described above. In a similar 
manner we construct the negative and positive government revenue shocks      and     . 
5.1 Systems with contemporaneous shocks 
 In the previous section we extracted four series of unanticipated fiscal policy shocks, 
from each one of the two VARs considered in this study. For each VAR these are the negative 
and positive government spending shocks and the negative and positive government revenue 
shocks series:      ,     ,      and      respectively. In order to investigate the possible 
existence of fiscal asymmetries, following Cover (1992), we run the following regression 
with each of the two sets of unanticipated fiscal policy shocks: 
         ∑          
 
                                          
         ,        (2) 
where       is the first difference of the real private GNP at period t,         are two lags of 
the output first differences,     ,     ,      and      are the extracted unanticipated fiscal 
shocks to the economy as discussed above and   ,   ,  ,  , and    are parameters to be 
estimated. In these systems we assume that only current fiscal policy shocks affect the real 
output growth level and thus we include no lagged values of the fiscal shocks. We also 
                                                             
3 For  an extended presentation see Blanchard et al (2002) and Baum et al. (2011).  
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estimate equation (2) with the cyclical component of the real private GNP as the dependent 
variable. The cyclical component of real private GNP is extracted using a standard Hodrick-
Prescott filter with       . The empirical results are presented in Table 4. Systems 1 and 3 
present the results of the estimation of equation (2) with the fiscal policy shocks identified 
from the VAR including the simple sum MZM monetary aggregate and Divisia MZM 
monetary aggregate respectively. System 5 includes the estimates of equation (2) when the 
dependent variable is the cyclical component of real private GNP and the fiscal policy shocks 
are identified from a VAR with the Divisia MZM as the monetary aggregate variable
4
.  
The estimated coefficients and the reported p-values of the fiscal policy shocks provide 
evidence on the significance and magnitude of the multipliers of the various fiscal shocks on 
the growth rate of real private GNP and its cyclical component. Moreover, at the lower part of 
Table 4 we report the tail areas of the F-tests performed in testing for fiscal policy 
asymmetries. First, we test the null hypothesis that the multiplier of a positive government 
spending shock is equal to the multiplier of a negative government spending shock (      
  ) or in other words that a contractionary government spending shock has a symmetric effect 
on output as an equal expansionary government spending shock. Second, in a similar manner, 
we test for symmetric effects of the contractionary and expansionary government revenue 
shocks (        ). Next, we try to investigate whether equivalent in terms of their impact 
on government deficit fiscal policies have symmetric effects on the level and growth rate of 
real GNP. First, we test policies that increase the deficit, positive government spending and 
negative government revenue shocks (        ) and finally shocks that lead to fiscal 
consolidation, a decrease in government spending and an increase in government revenue 
shock (        ). 
 According to Table 4 we have some interesting results. First, all coefficients have the 
signs expected by theory. The coefficients of positive government spending shocks (SGP) 
have positive signs as they are expected to increase real private GNP. The same sign is 
expected on the coefficients of the negative government spending shocks (SGN): a negative 
shock multiplied by a positive coefficient produces a decrease in real private GNP. For 
analogous reasons the estimated coefficients on unanticipated revenue shocks have negative 
signs: an unexpected increase in government revenue (SRP) is expected to reduce real private 
GNP and an unexpected decrease in government revenue (SRN) will increase real private 
GNP. 
 We detect some asymmetries across all three systems with respect to fiscal policy 
shocks. It appears that in the System 1 and 2 where the dependent variable is the growth rate 
of real private GNP expansionary and contractionary unanticipated fiscal policies have 
asymmetric effects: the expansionary fiscal policy through either a positive unanticipated 
government spending shock (SGP) or a negative unanticipated government revenue shock 
(SRN) is statistically significant with p-values of 0.008 and 0.052 respectively. On the 
contrary, a contractionary fiscal policy through either a negative unanticipated government 
spending shock (SGN) or a positive unanticipated government revenue shock (SRP) is not 
significant even at the 0.10 significance level. In System 5 where the dependent variable is the 
                                                             
4
 The relevant estimates with identified fiscal policy shocks from the VAR with the simple sum MZM 
monetary aggregate as the exogenous variable are not included here as they are qualitatively exactly 
the same as the ones of system 5. They are available of course from the authors upon request. 
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cyclical component of real private GNP it appears that only a positive unanticipated 
government revenue shock has some impact on the cycle. 
 
Both government spending and revenue tests show that in general expansionary unanticipated 
fiscal policy shocks have asymmetric effects and appear to affect real private output more 
than contractionary fiscal shocks as the later appear insignificant. Expansionary fiscal policy 
is significant either through spending or revenue. Nonetheless, the coefficient of the positive 
unanticipated government spending shock is more than three times larger than the coefficient 
of the negative unanticipated government revenue shock in Systems 1 and 3 and more than 
two times larger when the dependent variable is the cyclical component of real private GNP. 
In the lower part of Table 4, the F-tests show that this asymmetry is statistically significant 
only for System 1. 
5.2 Systems augmented with lagged shocks 
 In this section we augment the regressions run in equation (2) by assuming that not 
only the current values of the explanatory variables affect the level and growth rate of GDP 
but also four lags that correspond to a year’s worth of historical information. The estimated 
equation now becomes: 
         ∑           
 
    ∑                                              
 
   
                                (3)  
with similar specification as equation (2). The results from running equation (3) are presented 
in Table 5. Systems 2 and 4 have the growth rate of real private GNP as the dependent 
variable with fiscal policy shocks identified from a VAR with simple sum and Divisia MZM 
as the monetary aggregate exogenous variable respectively. System 6 is estimated with the 
cyclical component of real private GNP as the dependent variable and the identified residuals 
from the VAR with the Divisia MZM monetary aggregate
5
.  
The estimated coefficients and the reported p-values of the contemporaneous and lagged 
fiscal policy shocks provide evidence on the significance and magnitude of the multipliers of 
the various fiscal shocks on the level and growth rate of real GNP. In the lower part of Table 
5 we report the tail areas of the F-tests performed in testing for fiscal policy asymmetries. In 
this specification with contemporaneous and four lagged fiscal shocks we are able to perform 
the following tests: First, we test the null hypothesis that the coefficient of a contemporaneous 
positive government spending shock is equal to the coefficient of a contemporaneous negative 
government spending shock (          ) or in other words that an expansionary 
government spending shock has a symmetric effect on output as an equal contractionary 
government spending shock. In a similar manner, we test for symmetric effects of the 
expansionary and contractionary government revenue shocks with the null hypothesis 
(          ). Next, we test whether equivalent in terms of their impact on government 
deficit fiscal policies have asymmetric effects on the growth rate of real private GNP and its 
cyclical component. First, policies that increase the deficit, i.e. positive government spending 
and negative government revenue shocks (           ) and second, shocks that lead to 
                                                             
5
 Again, the relevant estimates with identified fiscal policy shocks from the VAR with the simple sum 
MZM monetary aggregate as the exogenous variable are not included here as they are qualitatively 
exactly the same as the ones of system 5. They are available of course from the authors upon request. 
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fiscal consolidation, a decrease in government spending and an increase in government 
revenue  (           ).  
Moreover, we perform F-tests that all lagged coefficients of the unanticipated fiscal policy 
shocks are jointly equal to zero:                                  . Finally, 
in the last two rows of Table 5 we test for asymmetric cumulative effects of contractionary 
and expansionary unanticipated fiscal policy shocks:  
                                                     
                 
 Table 5 summarizes the regressions results and the hypotheses testing evidence. 
According to these, the estimated coefficients of all unanticipated fiscal policy shocks that are 
statistically significant appear to have the correct sign. In System 2 where the dependent 
variable is the growth rate of real private GNP, no shock appears statistically significant. In 
System 4 with the same dependent variable but shocks identified from a VAR using the 
Divisia MZM as the exogenous monetary aggregate variable only the contemporaneous 
unexpected negative government spending shock appears statistically significant with a 
coefficient of 0.310 and a p-value of 0.075. In System 6 where the dependent variable is now 
the cyclical component of real private GNP, three types of unanticipated government shocks 
are significant: the contemporaneous positive and negative government spending with 
coefficients 0.237 and 0.423 respectively and the second lag of the positive government 
revenue shock with a coefficient of -0.161. the p-values of these estimates are 0.095, 0.012 
and 0.031 respectively.  
In the lower part of Table 5 we report the results of the F-tests discussed above. We find 
evidence of unanticipated fiscal shock asymmetries in three cases and only in System 6 where 
the dependent variable is the cyclical component of real private GNP: a) asymmetry in the 
type of contractionary policy as negative government spending shocks appear to have a 
significant impact on the cycle of real private GNP while positive government revenue shocks 
appear statistically insignificant and the p-value of the test of equality between the two is 
0.038; b) the joint test that all contemporaneous and lagged negative unanticipated 
government spending shocks appears statistically significant with p-value 0.094 while the 
positive joint government spending shock appears statistically insignificant; c) the joint test 
that all contemporaneous and lagged positive unanticipated government revenue shocks 
appears statistically significant with p-value 0.031 while the negative joint government 
revenue shock appears statistically insignificant. According to these results, only a 
contractionary unanticipated fiscal policy will have an impact on the cyclical component of 
GNP either through decreased government spending or increased government revenue. The 
joint impact of expansionary fiscal shocks appears statistically insignificant. In the last four 
rows of Table 5 we perform F-tests of equality between the cumulative effects of 
unanticipated fiscal policy shocks. We cannot reject any of these hypotheses. 
6. Conclusions 
 The aim of this paper was to empirically test the effects of fiscal policy shocks on the 
level and growth rate of real output and reveal possible asymmetries in fiscal policy 
implementation.  The data are quarterly over the period 1967:1 to 2011:4. In doing so, we 
used two alternative vector autoregressive systems in order to construct the fiscal policy 
11 
 
shocks. These systems differ in the monetary aggregate used as one of the exogenous 
variables: a simple sum MZM and a CFS Divisia MZM. From each one of these systems we 
extracted four types of shocks: a negative and a positive government spending shock and a 
negative and a positive government revenue shock. These six sets of unanticipated fiscal 
shocks were used next to empirically examine their effects on the level and growth rate of real 
private GNP in two sets of regressions: one that assumes only contemporaneous effects of the 
shocks on output and one that is augmented with four lags of each fiscal shock. Our results 
are summarized as follows: 
In the regressions with no lagged shocks we detect some asymmetries across all three systems 
with respect to fiscal policy shocks. When the dependent variable is the growth rate of real 
private GNP expansionary and contractionary unanticipated fiscal policies have asymmetric 
effects: the expansionary fiscal policy through either a positive unanticipated government 
spending shock (SGP) or a negative unanticipated government revenue shock (SRN) is 
statistically significant with p-values of 0.008 and 0.052 respectively while a contractionary 
fiscal policy through either a negative unanticipated government spending shock (SGN) or a 
positive unanticipated government revenue shock (SRP) is not significant. When the 
dependent variable is the cyclical component of real private GNP it appears that only a 
positive unanticipated government revenue shock has some impact on the cycle. We find that 
in general, expansionary unanticipated fiscal policy shocks have asymmetric effects and 
appear to affect real private output more than contractionary fiscal shocks as the later appear 
insignificant. Expansionary fiscal policy is significant either through spending or revenue 
even though the coefficient of the positive government spending shock is more than three 
times larger than the coefficient of the negative government revenue shock in the systems 
with growth rate of GNP as the dependent variable and more than two times larger in the 
when the dependent variable is the GNP cyclical component. 
 Finally, in the systems with lags, only the contemporaneous unexpected negative 
government spending shock appears statistically significant in System 4. In System 6, where 
the dependent variable is now the cyclical component of real private GNP, three types of 
unanticipated shocks are significant: the contemporaneous positive and negative government 
spending and the second lag of the positive government revenue shock.  
In these systems, we find evidence of asymmetries in three cases and only in when the 
dependent variable is the cyclical component of real private GNP: a) asymmetry in the type of 
contractionary policy (negative government spending shocks have a significant impact on the 
cycle of real private GNP while positive government revenue shocks appear statistically 
insignificant) b) the joint test that all contemporaneous and lagged negative unanticipated 
government spending shocks appears statistically significant while the positive joint 
government spending shock appears statistically insignificant and c) the joint test that all 
contemporaneous and lagged positive unanticipated government revenue shocks appears 
statistically significant while the negative joint government revenue shocks appear 
statistically insignificant.  
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Table 1. Unit Root Tests 
      
 
A. ADF Test 
 
B. KPSS Test 
 
C. Elliott et al. Test 
  Variable Level   1st Diff.   Level   1st Diff.  Level   1st Diff.   Decision 
 
Null Hypothesis: I(1) 
 
Null Hypothesis: I(0) 
 
Null Hypothesis: I(1) 
  
 
Probability margin 
 
LM-Stat 
 
Test statistic 
  
Endogenous Variables: Real Variables                    
        r 0.799 
 
0.000 *** 0.211 ** 0.036 
 
20.609 
 
1.635 *** I(1) 
g 0.745 
 
0.000 *** 0.122 * 0.081 
 
24.006 
 
1.336 *** I(1) 
y 0.114 
 
0.000 *** 0.113 
 
0.044 
 
4.350 * 1.352 *** I(1) 
              Exogenous Variables: Monetary Variables                 
              Simple Sum 
MZM 0.856 
 
0.000 *** 0.205 ** 0.114 
 
14.708 
 
1.331 *** I(1) 
CFS Divisia 
MZM 0.038 ** 0.014 ** 0.087 
 
0.060 
 
1.473 *** 3.445 *** I(1) 
TB3 0.323 
 
0.000 *** 0.224 *** 0.028 
 
13.186 
 
1.260 *** I(1) 
                         
The  tests are done with an intercept and a trend. 
        *, ** or ***, denote denote a rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. 
   The 10%, 5% and 1% critical values for the KPSS tests are 0.119, 0.146 and 0.216 respectively.
  The 10%, 5% and 1% critical values for the Elliot-Rothenberg-Stock tests are 6.845, 5.656 and 4.094 respectively. 
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Table 2. Systems Employed in Fiscal Policy Shock Extraction 
  Dependent Variable 
 
Exogenous Variables 
 
r g y 
 
TB3 
Simple 
Sum MZM 
Divisia 
MZM 
Lags 
VAR 1            
 
       
 
4 
VAR 2                         4 
 
 
Table 3. Johansen Maximum Likelihood Cointegration Tests 
   
Endogenous Exogenous 
VAR 
Lags 
Normality 
J-B joint 
test 
Serial  
Correlation 
LM test 
Null 
Hypothesis 
      
       
Coint. 
Vectors 
           r, g, y TB3 4 0.000 0.240 r = 0 0.008 *** 0.025 ** 1 
 
Sum MZM 
   
r <= 1 0.122 
 
0.305 
  
     
r <= 2 0.045 ** 0.045 ** 
 
           r, g, y TB3 4 0.000 0.288 r = 0 0.001 *** 0.013 ** 1 
 
Divisia MZM 
   
r <= 1 0.019 ** 0.215 
            r <= 2 0.004 *** 0.004 ***   
One, two and three asteriscs denote rejection of the null hypotheis at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 4. Fiscal Policy Shocks on the Level of Real Private GNP 
 
System 1 
 
System 3 
 
System 5 
   Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value  
C 0.002 0.219 
 
0.002 0.266 
 
-0.001 0.303 
 d(y(-1)) 0.214 0.004 *** 0.206 0.020 ** 1.101 0.000 *** 
d(y(-2)) 0.155 0.027 ** 0.136 0.030 ** -0.274 0.003 *** 
d(TB3) 0.002 0.004 *** 0.002 0.058 * 0.003 0.026 ** 
d(MZM) 0.118 0.002 *** 0.197 0.001 *** 0.080 0.172 
 SGP 0.406 0.008 *** 0.364 0.077 * 0.138 0.412 
 SGN 0.217 0.113 
 
0.226 0.226 
 
0.436 0.012 
 SRP -0.102 0.166 
 
-0.123 0.194 
 
-0.124 0.061 * 
SRN -0.124 0.052 * -0.119 0.087 * -0.067 0.295 
 
          F-Tests 
         SGP=SGN 
 
0.444
  
0.690
  
0.313
 SRP=SRN 
 
0.848 
  
0.979 
  
0.566 
 SGP=SRN 
 
0.088 * 
 
0.256 
  
0.677 
 SGN=SRP   0.460     0.578    0.109  
Note: *, ** and ***, denote a rejection of the null hypothesis at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels 
respectively 
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Table 5.  Fiscal Policy Shocks on  Real Private GNP using Four Lags 
 
 
System 2 
 
System 4 
 
System 6 
   Coef. prob.  Coef. prob.  Coef. prob.  
C 0.000 0.953 
 
0.001 0.668 
 
-0.003 0.124 
 d(y((-1)) 0.265 0.003 *** 0.240 0.010 ** 0.943 0.000 *** 
d(y((-2)) 0.203 0.019 ** 0.195 0.032 ** 0.020 0.873 
 d(y((-3)) 0.050 0.577 
 
0.029 0.730 
 
-0.146 0.132 
 d(y((-4)) -0.008 0.922 
 
-0.016 0.845 
 
-0.045 0.560 
 d(TB3) 0.001 0.428 
 
0.001 0.272 
 
0.002 0.075 * 
d(TB3(-1)) 0.001 0.420 
 
0.002 0.077 * 0.003 0.017 ** 
d(TB3(-2)) 0.000 0.957 
 
0.001 0.551 
 
0.002 0.028 ** 
d(TB3(-3)) 0.001 0.725 
 
0.000 0.800 
 
0.003 0.017 ** 
d(TB3(-4)) -0.003 0.010 ** -0.003 0.000 *** -0.001 0.235 
 d(mzm) 0.081 0.138 
 
0.232 0.032 ** 0.123 0.305 
 d(mzm(-1)) 0.126 0.032 ** 0.233 0.032 ** 0.228 0.011 ** 
d(mzm(-2)) -0.012 0.858 
 
-0.035 0.727 
 
0.036 0.695 
 d(mzm(-3)) -0.039 0.662 
 
-0.199 0.074 * -0.093 0.286 
 d(mzm(-4)) -0.004 0.937 
 
-0.007 0.917 
 
-0.080 0.164 
 SGP 0.296 0.214 
 
0.275 0.210 
 
0.237 0.095 * 
SGP(-1) 0.015 0.921 
 
0.077 0.633 
 
0.052 0.709 
 SGP(-2) -0.120 0.370 
 
-0.044 0.761 
 
-0.166 0.156 
 SGP(-3) -0.257 0.151 
 
-0.213 0.199 
 
-0.136 0.290 
 SGP(-4) -0.115 0.431 
 
-0.173 0.262 
 
-0.118 0.326 
 SGN 0.273 0.165 
 
0.310 0.075 * 0.423 0.012 ** 
SGN(-1) -0.180 0.283 
 
-0.131 0.419 
 
-0.149 0.283 
 SGN(-2) -0.052 0.690 
 
-0.063 0.606 
 
0.043 0.754 
 SGN(-3) -0.204 0.184 
 
-0.193 0.204 
 
0.046 0.705 
 SGN(-4) 0.118 0.425 
 
0.145 0.334 
 
0.222 0.173 
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Table 5 (continued).  Fiscal Policy Shocks on  Real Private GNP using Four 
Lags 
SRP -0.073 0.461 
 
-0.097 0.345 
 
-0.064 0.273 
 SRP(-1) 0.135 0.123 
 
0.116 0.167 
 
-0.065 0.344 
 SRP(-2) 0.076 0.373 
 
0.057 0.493 
 
-0.161 0.031 ** 
SRP(-3) -0.054 0.420 
 
-0.048 0.459 
 
-0.069 0.168 
 SRP(-4) 0.056 0.455 
 
0.057 0.416 
 
0.075 0.308 
 SRN -0.161 0.071 
 
-0.187 0.011 
 
-0.206 0.001 
 SRN(-1) -0.030 0.710 
 
-0.024 0.738 
 
0.045 0.610 
 SRN(-2) 0.017 0.788 
 
0.058 0.309 
 
0.112 0.070 
 SRN(-3) 0.049 0.464 
 
0.064 0.315 
 
0.070 0.214 
 SRN(-4) 0.020 0.721 
 
0.020 0.724 
 
-0.015 0.723 
 
          
 
System 2 
 
System 4 
 
System 6 
 F-Tests 
         SGP=SGN 
 
0.951
  
0.923
  
0.478
 SRP=SRN 
 
0.578 
  
0.530 
  
0.118 
 SGP=SRN 
 
0.590 
  
0.701 
  
0.840 
 SGN=SRP 
 
0.293 
  
0.227 
  
0.038 ** 
joint SGP=0 
 
0.686 
  
0.843 
  
0.638 
 joint SGN=0 
 
0.896 
  
0.807 
  
0.094 * 
joint SRP=0 
 
0.376 
  
0.585 
  
0.031 ** 
joint SRN=0 
 
0.574 
  
0.656 
  
0.968 
 Σ SGP = Σ SGN 
 
0.841 
  
0.799 
  
0.179 
 Σ SRP = Σ SRN 
 
0.348 
  
0.495 
  
0.161 
 Σ SGP = Σ SRN 
 
0.628 
  
0.768 
  
0.676 
 Σ SGN = Σ SRP   0.748    0.561    0.437  
Note: *, ** and ***, denote a rejection of the null hypothesis at the 0.10, 0.05 
and 0.01 levels respectively 
 
